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Max-Min Fair Sensor Scheduling: Game-theoretic
Perspective and Algorithmic Solution
Shuang Wu1, Xiaoqiang Ren2, Yiguang Hong3 and Ling Shi1
Abstract—We consider the design of a fair sensor schedule for
a number of sensors monitoring different linear time-invariant
processes. The largest average remote estimation error among all
processes is to be minimized. We first consider a general setup
for the max-min fair allocation problem. By reformulating the
problem as its equivalent form, we transform the fair resource
allocation problem into a zero-sum game between a “judge”
and a resource allocator. We propose an equilibrium seeking
procedure and show that there exists a unique Nash equilibrium
in pure strategy for this game. We then apply the result to the
sensor scheduling problem and show that the max-min fair sensor
scheduling policy can be achieved.
Index Terms—Kalman filtering, state estimation, scheduling,
max-min fairness, game theory.
I. INTRODUCTION
A wireless sensor network consists of a group of sensor
nodes deployed in an area. The sensors sense and take mea-
surements of the surrounding environment and transmit the
obtained data through a wireless communication channel to
a data aggregation center which performs state estimation.
Thanks to their large-scale deployment, the wireless sensor
networks have gained popularity in a wide range of applica-
tions such as environmental monitoring and target tracking [1].
However, resource constraints, including the amount of energy
and the wireless communication channel bandwidth, pose
challenges to system design and synthesis.
The sensor scheduling problem has been proposed to utilize
the limited resources for enhancing the remote estimation
quality. Energy consumption minimization along with sensor
lifetime maximization have been studied in [2]–[4]. In the
mean time, another stream of research has been focusing on
balancing the communication burden and a certain cost func-
tion related to estimation accuracy. Shi et al. [5] showed that
the optimal schedule for a single sensor scheduling is periodic
if packet drops are ignored. Chakravorty and Mahajan [6]
obtained a general result which stated that the optimal policy
is of threshold type. Similar threshold-type structural results
are obtained for multiple sensors [7]–[10]. The cost function
in the above mentioned works is the summation of all the
estimation errors. In some scenarios, one is not interested
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in optimizing a collective quantity of each individual, e.g.,
summation of all the estimation errors, but desires that each
individual’s performance is above certain threshold. Moreover,
each individual has its own interests and may not be willing
to reach a collective goal by sacrificing their own benefits.
These demands lead to a requirement of fairness in scheduling
policies.
In this work, we consider how to fairly allocate the limited
communication resources to the sensors. To the best of our
knowledge, fairness issue in the sensor scheduling problem
has not been addressed. One major challenge is to propose
a fairness metric for analysis. The fairness has been studied
in operation research and communication community. The
works in [11]–[13] studied fairness issue in queuing systems,
while the works in [14]–[16] addressed fairness issue for
communication protocols. Lan et al. [17] summarized a variety
of proposed fairness metrics and developed a set of axioms to
identify one metric to be fair. Bertsimas et al. [18] pointed
out that max-min fairness and proportional fairness are two
axiomatically justified and well accepted notations of fairness.
The proportional fairness can be obtained by maximizing the
summation of the log function of the utility of each user.
Analysis and computation of solutions to proportional fairness
can be done by using the same method as those for multiple
sensor scheduling in the literature.
The max-min fairness is taken as the notation of fairness
in this work. We consider n sensors measuring n independent
linear time-invariant dynamic processes. The sensors transmit
their measurements to a remote state estimator through a
shared wireless communication channel. Due to the con-
strained bandwidth, the allowable transmissions are limited.
We want the maximal average estimation error covariance
among the n sensors to be as small as possible, which
constitutes the max-min fairness problem. Interestingly, if the
processes are all unstable, the max-min fairness formulation
leads to an equal estimation performance (Proposition 1).
Although the max-min fairness metric is clearly defined, the
corresponding mathematical problem is to be formulated.
There are noticeable amount of works addressing max-min
fair scheduling in wireless sensor networks. However, the
problems they studied considered are different from ours. The
works in [19], [20] considered max-min fairness of data flows
in the communication links. Their design goal is to maximize
the bottleneck of the whole network. The works in [21], [22]
considered how to schedule transmissions to maximize the
lowest throughput over the MAC-layer. In summary, these
works considered the fairness solely either from the data
link or the routing perspective. None of the existing works
2addressed the max-min fairness by jointly considering the
remote state estimation and bandwidth allocation.
The main results of this paper are summarized as follows.
1) We consider the max-min fairness in terms of remote state
estimation performance for sensor scheduling problem,
which cannot be directly solved using existing numerical
schemes. We formulate it as a general max-min fair
resource allocation problem. We reformulate it as a two-
player zero-sum game, which consists of two players,
a “judge” who adjusts the weights of each sensor and
an “allocator” who determines the resource allocation.
We prove that the game possesses pure-strategy Nash
Equilibriums (Theorem 1).
2) For the general max-min fair allocation problem, we
propose an algorithm to seek the equilibrium and show
that the algorithm converges to the max-min fair allo-
cation scheme (Theorem 2 and 3). The max-min fair
sensor scheduling problem does not satisfy some of
the assumptions made for the general case. We adjust
the algorithm as Algorithm 1 to seek a max-min fair
allocation for sensor scheduling. This adjusted algorithm
converges to the max-min allocation with a high accuracy.
(Theorem 4).
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. In
section II, we develop a general framework for the max-min
fair resource allocation problem. In section III, we apply the
theory developed to solve a fair sensor scheduling problem.
The paper is summarized in section IV.
Notations: The n-dimension Euclidean space is denoted
by Rn. The bold symbol letter stands for a vector which
aggregates all its components, e.g., x = [x1, . . . , xn]
⊤. In
particular, 1 = [1, . . . , 1]⊤. The inequality between a vector in
the Euclidean space means that the inequality holds elemen-
twise. For a matrix X , X⊤ and Tr(X) stand for the matrix
transpose and the trace of the matrix. The operation PX (x)
denotes the projection of vector x into the constrained set X ,
i.e., PX (x) = argminx′∈X ‖x−x′‖2, where ‖ · ‖2 stands for
the Euclidean-norm. The probability and condition probability
are denoted by Pr(·) and Pr(·|·), respectively. The expectation
of a random variable is E[·].
II. THE FAIR RESOURCE ALLOCATION PROBLEM
A. Max-Min Fair Resource Allocation
Consider a group of n agents. Each agent i = 1, . . . , n
aims to minimize a certain cost Ji(ri) by consuming certain
resource ri. The total resource is limited and characterized by∑n
i=1 ri ≤ R. Moreover, the resource utilized by each agent
has both an upper bound and a lower bound, i.e., ri ≤ ri ≤ ri.
We aim to find a centralized max-min fair resource utilization
scheme r =
[
r1, . . . , rn
]⊤
among the n agents as follows.
Problem 1
min
r
max
i∈I
Ji(ri)
s.t. 1⊤r ≤ R,
r ≤ r ≤ r,
where I = {1, . . . , n}.
This problem aims at optimizing the cost of the “worst”
agent. A central manager solves the above resource allocation
problem and each individual uses the allocated resource to
optimize its own performance.
Remark 1 Problem 1 involves a mixture of numerical (con-
tinuous) strategy r and categorical (discrete) strategy i. When
the strategy is either purely continuous or discrete, efficient
algorithms can be developed to solve the problem [23]. If
both sets of strategies are discrete, we can reformulate the
problem as a linear program by considering the notion of
mixed strategy for discrete strategies. In the linear program
setup, the strategy sets are continuous. In a continuous game,
we can calculate the gradient of the game value with respect
to the strategies, which is useful to seek the Nash equilibrium
of the game. However, the mixture of continuous and discrete
strategies prohibits direct calculation of the gradients.
It is expected that more allocated resource leads to a
smaller cost and the benefit of using resource should have
a decreasing effect. Moreover, Ji(ri) should be continuous in
ri. We therefore made the following assumptions on Ji(ri).
Assumption 1 (Continuity) For every i, the cost Ji(ri) is
continuous in ri.
Assumption 2 (Strict Monotonicity) For every i, the cost
Ji(ri) is strictly monotone decreasing in ri, i.e.,
Ji(r
′
i) > Ji(ri)
for any r′i < ri.
Assumption 3 (Convexity) For every i, the cost Ji(ri) is
convex in ri, i.e.,
tJi(r
′
i) + (1− t)Ji(ri) ≥ Ji(tr′i + (1− t)ri)
for any ri, r
′
i and t ∈ [0, 1].
Moreover, we assume the costs are always strictly positive.
Assumption 4 (Strict Positivity) The cost of each agent
Ji(ri) > 0 for ri ∈ [ri, ri] and any i ∈ I.
Remark 2 The strict monotonicity and the convexity assump-
tion of the cost with respect to allocated resources can
be interpreted as follows. Consider the following total cost
minimization problem.
min
x
fi(x)
s.t. gi(x) ≤ ri.
The cost fi(x) and utilized resource gi(x) are negatively
correlated, i.e., fi(x) > fi(x
′) if and only if gi(x) < gi(x
′) for
any x 6= x′. Hence, minimization is attained only if gi(x) = ri.
Let Ji(ri) = minx:gi(x)≤ri fi(x). The strict monotonicity of
Ji(ri) then follows. We further assume that strong duality
holds, i.e.,
min
x
max
λ≥0
fi(x) + λ(gi(x) − ri) = max
λ≥0
min
x
fi(x) + λ(gi(x) − ri).
3Let x⋆ and λ⋆ be the corresponding minimizer and maximizer.
Note that
Ji(ri) =min
x
fi(x) + λ
⋆(gi(x) − ri)
≤fi(x) + λ⋆(gi(x) − ri)
for all x. Let x
′⋆ be the solution to the minimization with total
cost r′i. We can obtain
Ji(ri) ≤fi(x′⋆) + λ⋆(gi(x′⋆)− ri)
=Ji(r
′
i) + λ
⋆(r′i − ri).
In summary, for any ri, there exists a λ
⋆ such that
Ji(ri)− λ⋆(r′i − ri) ≤ Ji(r′i) (1)
for all r′i. From the first order condition of a convex function,
the cost Ji(ri) is convex in ri.
To make the optimal value of Problem 1 bounded, we
need further assumptions on the cost objective and the total
resource. Define the set of feasible allocation schemes as
R , {r : 1⊤r ≤ R, r ≤ r ≤ r}.
We further have the following the assumption of the total
resource R.
Assumption 5 The lower bounds ri satisfies
∑
i∈I ri < R.
In addition, there exists a feasible allocation scheme r ∈ R
such that Ji(ri) <∞ for all i ∈ I.
If the first half of the assumption fails, the feasible region does
not contain an interior point. If the other half fails, the total
cost under any allocation is unbounded, which leads to the
nonexistence of any max-min fair allocation scheme.
B. Game Reformulation
The formulation in Problem 1 does not reveal any inner
structures of the problem and cannot help determine whether
there exists a solution to the resource allocation problem. In
the following, we transform the original allocation problem as
a two-player zero-sum game with continuous actions. With this
reformulated problem, we can obtain existence of a solution
and some properties of such a solution.
The max-min fair allocation problem can be transformed
as a two-player zero-sum game. Let W , {w : 1⊤w =
1, w ≥ 0}. We have two players with strategies r ∈ R and
w ∈ W , respectively. Each of the player is solving a coupled
optimization problem
min
r∈R
g(w, r) and max
w∈W
g(w, r), (2)
where g(w, r) =
∑n
i=1 wiJi(ri). This can be viewed as
a zero-sum game between a “judge” with action w and
a resource allocator with action r. The “judge” wants to
maximize it by adjustingw, while the resource allocator wants
to minimize it by allocating r. If this game possesses at least
one pure-strategy Nash equilibrium (r⋆,w⋆), by the definition
of a Nash equilibrium, r⋆ is a solution of the original problem.
From the results in game theory, an equilibrium in the pure
strategy exists for this game.
Theorem 1 The two-player zero-sum game in (2) has the
following properties:
1) there exists a pure-strategy Nash equilibrium;
2) the value of the game is unique;
3) there may exist multiple pure-strategy equilibrium pairs,
but the weight w at equilibriums is unique.
Proof: The proof is done in three steps:
1) there exists a pure strategy equilibrium;
2) the value of the game is unique;
3) w at equilibriums is unique.
We first verify the existence. Note that
• both W and R is compact and convex;
• the utility of w, g(w, r), is continuous in r, and the
utility of r, −g(w, r), is continuous in w;
• g(w, r) is continuous and linear (thus also concave) in
w, and −g(w, r) is continuous and concave in r.
According to [24, Theorem 1.2], this continuous game pos-
sesses at least one pure-strategy Nash equilibrium.
We next prove the uniqueness of the value of the game.
Suppose both (w⋆, r⋆) and (w⋆⋆, r⋆⋆) are equilibrium strate-
gies.
If g(w⋆, r⋆) ≤ g(w⋆⋆, r⋆⋆), we have
g(w⋆⋆, r⋆) ≤ g(w⋆, r⋆) ≤ g(w⋆⋆, r⋆⋆) ≤ g(w⋆⋆, r⋆),
which leads to
g(w⋆, r⋆) = g(w⋆⋆, r⋆⋆).
If g(w⋆, r⋆) ≥ g(w⋆⋆, r⋆⋆), we have
g(w⋆, r⋆⋆) ≥ g(w⋆, r⋆) ≥ g(w⋆⋆, r⋆⋆) ≥ g(w⋆, r⋆⋆),
which also leads to
g(w⋆, r⋆) = g(w⋆⋆, r⋆⋆).
We lastly prove the uniqueness of w at equilibriums. Again
assume both (w⋆, r⋆) and (w⋆⋆, r⋆⋆) are equilibrium strate-
gies. Note that
g(w⋆, r⋆) ≤ g(w⋆, r⋆⋆) ≤ g(w⋆⋆, r⋆⋆)
g(w⋆⋆, r⋆⋆) ≤ g(w⋆⋆, r⋆) ≤ g(w⋆, r⋆),
which leads to
g(w⋆, r⋆) = g(w⋆, r⋆⋆) = g(w⋆⋆, r⋆) = g(w⋆⋆, r⋆⋆).
Since Ji(ri) is strictly monotone in ri, we have Ji(r
⋆
i ) 6=
Ji(r
⋆⋆
i ) for r
⋆
i 6= r⋆⋆i . Suppose w⋆ 6= w⋆⋆. As Ji(ri) are
strictly greater than zero, we have g(w⋆, r⋆) 6= g(w⋆⋆, r⋆)
and g(w⋆, r⋆⋆) 6= g(w⋆⋆, r⋆⋆), which violates the uniqueness
of the value of the game. Therefore, it holds that w⋆ = w⋆⋆.
As the equilibrium in the pure strategy exists, we are
able to obtain a solution of Problem 1. In addition, we can
observe some properties of a solution of Problem 1. From the
following example, we can see that the optimal value and w
at equilibriums of the game are unique, but there are multiple
max-min allocation strategies.
4Example 1 Let J1(t) = 4 − t, J2(t) = J3(t) = 1.5 − t and
R = {r : 1⊤r ≤ 1.5, 0 ≤ r ≤ 1}. It is straightforward
that any r in {r : r1 = 1, r2 + r3 ≤ 0.5} is a max-min fair
allocation strategy. However, the corresponding weight w⋆ is
unique as w⋆ =
[
1 0 0
]⊤
.
The following corollary connects the max-min fairness with
the equal performance. In this case, there exists a unique max-
min fair allocation strategy.
Corollary 1 If w⋆i > 0 for each i ∈ I, then there exists a
unique max-min fair allocation strategy r⋆ = [r⋆1 . . . r
⋆
n]
⊤
such that
Ji(r
⋆
i ) = max
j∈I
Jj(r
⋆
j ).
Proof: Let w⋆ be the the one at the equilibrium. As w⋆
is unique, the value of the game can be represented by
max
w
n∑
i=1
wiJi(r
⋆
i )
s.t. 1⊤w = 1, w ≥ 0.
Noting that the constraints are linear, the constraint qualifica-
tion conditions hold. The corresponding Karush-Kuhn-Tucker
(KKT) conditions are
J(r⋆)− λ⋆1+ µ⋆ = 0, (gradient condtion)
µ⋆ ≤ 0, (dual feasiblity)
µ⋆iw
⋆
i = 0, i ∈ I (complementary slackness)
where λ⋆ is the dual variable associated with the constraint
1
⊤w⋆ = 1 and µ⋆ is the dual variable associated with the
constraint w⋆ ≥ 0.
As µ⋆ ≤ 0, we always have Ji(r⋆i ) ≤ λ⋆. Combining the
gradient condition and the dual feasibility, we have Ji(r
⋆
i ) =
λ⋆, if µ⋆i = 0. From the complementary slackness, we know
that µ⋆i = 0 if w
⋆
i > 0. Therefore if w
⋆
i > 0, we can obtain that
Ji(r
⋆
i ) = λ
⋆, which leads to that Ji(r
⋆
i ) = λ
⋆ = maxi Ji(r
⋆
i ).
This also proves that r⋆ is unique.
As a direct consequence of the corollary, for a general w⋆,
we can obtain Ji(r
⋆
i ) = maxj∈I Jj(r
⋆
j ) if w
⋆
i > 0.
Remark 3 Note that wi > 0 is only sufficient for the
Ji(r
⋆
i ) = maxi Ji(r
⋆
i ). However, this equality may still hold
when wi = 0. Suppose w
⋆
i = 0 for some i ∈ I, the
consumed resource must be r⋆i = ri since Ji(ri) is strictly
monotone decreasing. Otherwise, the resource available for
other agents is smaller and g(w, r) =
∑
i:wi 6=0
wiJi(ri)
increases. Therefore, if w⋆i = 0, we have
max
ri
Ji(ri) = Ji(ri) = Ji(r
⋆
i ) ≤ λ⋆ = max
j
Jj(r
⋆
i ),
which still includes the possibility that Ji(r
⋆
i ) = maxj Jj(r
⋆
i ).
C. Cost-Based Solution Seeking
The above theorem only ensures the existence of a pure-
strategy equilibrium for the corresponding game, but does not
provide a computation procedure to obtain such a equilibrium.
One may expect to use a best response algorithm. Specifically,
we alternate between solving a linear programming and a
convex program. The solution of the linear program is the
best response of w given r, while the solution of the convex
program is the best response of r given w. A best response
algorithm, however, does not converge in general as claimed
by [23, Sec 1.4.3]. In this work, the best response also fails.
We propose a cost-based algorithm to obtain the max-min
fair allocation scheme. Note that for a given allocation r,
if Ji(ri) is too large, we should increase ri. Conversely, if
Ji(ri) is small, it should donate its resource. Based on this
observation, we propose the following algorithm:
r(t+ 1) = T (r(t)) , PR
(
rt + εJ(r(t))
)
. (3)
The equilibrium of (3) is a solution of Problem 1.
Theorem 2 If r⋆ is the equilibrium of the discrete-time pro-
jected dynamics (3), i.e., r⋆ = T (r⋆), then for any allocation
r
max
i∈I
Ji(r
⋆
i ) ≤ max
i∈I
Ji(ri).
The proof is technical and we left it in the appendix in the
online version [25].
The update inside the projection only requires local informa-
tion of the cost function, i.e., the value of the cost Ji(ri(t)) at
ri(t). However, the projection still requires knowledge of every
ri(t). We discuss a distributed extension of this algorithm
in Appendix-B in the online version [25]. To guarantee the
convergence of the algorithm in (3), we impose the following
assumption on Ji(ri).
Assumption 6 The optimal value Ji(ri) satisfies, for any ri
and r′i in [ri, ri],
(1) (strong monotonicity) there exists a positive real number
αi such that
αi|ri − r′i| ≤ |Ji(ri)− Ji(r′i)|;
(2) (βi-Lipschitz) there exists a positive real number βi such
that
|Ji(ri)− Ji(r′i)| ≤ βi|ri − r′i|.
This assumption means that the variations of the costs with
respect to allocated resources are mild.
Theorem 3 There exists ε ∈ (0, 2α
β2
), where α = mini αi and
β = maxi βi, such that the algorithm (3) converges with a
linear convergence rate.
Proof: We prove the convergence to a unique point
by showing that the update is contractive. Because of the
nonexpansive property of a projection to a convex set, we
have
‖T (r)− T (r′)‖2 ≤ ‖r + εJ(r)− r′ − εJ(r′)‖2
Expanding the right hand side, we obtain
‖T (r)− T (r′)‖2
≤‖r − r′‖2 + 2ε(r − r′)⊤(J(r)− J(r′))
+ ε2‖J(r)− J(r′)‖2.
5Note that for each i, (ri − r′i)(Ji(ri)− Ji(r′i)) < 0 due to
the monotonicity of Ji(ri). Therefore, we have
(r − r′)⊤(J(r) − J(r′)) = −|r − r′|⊤|J(r)− J(r′)|.
From Assumption 6, there exists a αi > 0 such that
|Ji(ri)− Ji(r′i)| ≥ αi|ri − r′i|.
Let α = mini αi, we have
|r − r′|⊤|J(r) − J(r′)| ≥ α‖r − r′‖2,
which leads to
(r − r′)⊤(J(r)− J(r′)) ≤ −α‖r − r′‖2.
Consequently,
‖T (r)− T (r′)‖2
≤‖r − r′‖2 − 2εα‖r − r′‖2 + ε2‖J(r)− J(r′)‖2.
Meanwhile, from Assumption 6, we also know that
‖J(r)− J(r′)‖2 ≤ β‖r − r′‖2,
where β = maxi βi. We can obtain
‖T (r)− T (r′)‖2 ≤
[
1 + (ε2β2 − 2εα)
]
‖r − r′‖2.
Therefore, as long as 0 < ε < 2α
β2
, there exists a real number
0 < c < 1 and a point r⋆ = T (r⋆) such that, for any r ∈ R,
‖T (r)− r⋆‖2 = ‖T (r)− T (r⋆)‖2 ≤ c‖r − r⋆‖2.
Denoting the error of r(k) as e(k) = ‖r(k) − r⋆‖2, we can
obtain e(k+1) ≤ ce(k), which proves the linear convergence
rate.
III. APPLICATION IN FAIR SENSOR SCHEDULING
A. Problem Setup
Consider n LTI processes, each measured by one sensor.
The dynamics are as follows:
x(i)(k + 1) = Aix
(i)(k) + w(i)(k), (4)
y(i)(k) = Hix
(i)(k) + v(i)(k), (5)
where i ∈ N , {1, . . . , n}, x(i)(k) ∈ Rni is the state of
the i-th system at time k and y(i)(k) ∈ Rmi is the noisy
measurement taken by the sensors. For all processes and
k ≥ 0, the state disturbance noise w(i)(k)’s, the measurement
noise v(i)(k)’s and the initial state x(i)(0)’s are mutually in-
dependent Gaussian random variables, which follow Gaussian
distributions as w(i)(k) ∼ N (0, Qi), v(i)(k) ∼ N (0, Ri) and
x(i)(0) ∼ N (0,Πi). The covariance matrices Qi and Πi are
positive semidefinite, and Ri is positive definite. We assume
that, for every i ∈ N , the pair (Ai, Hi) is observable and the
pair (Ai,
√
Qi) is controllable.
The sensors measure the process states and compute local
state estimates using a Kalman filter. After that, the sensors
transmit the estimate data through a communication network
under resource constraints to a remote state estimator. The
remote state estimator will either synchronize the remote state
estimates with the local state estimate if the updated data
is received, or use process dynamics to predict the state
estimates if no data is received. For sensor i at time k, we use
ai(k) = 1 to denote transmission and ai(k) = 0 otherwise.
The estimation error covariance of the remote estimator for
each process P (i) at time k + 1 can be computed as follows:
P (i)(k + 1) =
{
P i, if ai(k) = 1,
AiP
(i)(k)A⊤i +Qi, if ai(k) = 0,
where P i is the steady state of the state estimation error
covariance of the local Kalman filter.
In this work, we assume that the information available to
transmission decision is
τi(k) = min{t ≥ 0 : ai(k − t) = 1},
which is the time elapsed since the last successful transmis-
sion. Transmission decisions of the senors are defined by
fi(τi(k)) := Pr(ai(k)|τi(k)),
where ai(k) = 1 denotes transmission and ai(k) = 0 denotes
no transmission. We are interested in allocating the average
communication rates of the senors to minimize the largest
average remote state estimation error. This can be formulated
as
min
r∈R
max
i∈I
Ji(ri), (6)
where the constraint set is
R := {r : 1⊤r ≤ R, 0 ≤ r ≤ 1},
and the performance metric is
Ji(ri) := lim sup
T→∞
1
T
T−1∑
k=0
Tr(P (i)(k))).
To transform the problem as the standard setting in the last
section, we need to study properties of Ji(ri). This requires
analysis of optimal scheduling polices for a single sensor.
Remark 4 Some papers studied the state estimation problem
from a zero-sum game perspective [26], [27]. Their problems
are different from ours. They studied the worst-case estimation
error estimator in face of model uncertainty. The related game
is between the state estimator and the nature who exerts
uncertain disturbance to the system. The estimator wants
to minimize the estimation error while the nature wants to
maximize the estimation error.
B. Single Sensor Scheduling
Given an average communication rate ri for sensor i, the
following single sensor scheduling problem is well solved
min
fi
Ji(fi)
s.t. Ci(fi) ≤ ri,
where fi is the scheduling policy for sensor i and Ci(fi) =
limT→∞
1
T+1E[
∑T
k=0 ai(k)]. The settings in [6] are similar
to this problem. By using a similar approach, we can obtain
the same results for the single sensor scheduling problem as
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Fig. 1. The optimal average estimation error of the single sensor scheduling
under constrained communication is piecewise linear, convex and nonincreas-
ing w.r.t. communication rate.
those in [6]. We recap essential results of this single sensor
scheduling problem.
Recall that τi(k) stands for the time elapsed since the last
successful transmission. A threshold policy with threshold ξi
is defined as follows. Transmit if τi(k) ≥ ξi and do not
transmit otherwise. An optimal policy of the constrained single
sensor scheduling is a randomized threshold strategy, which
randomizes between two thresholds ξi and ξi + 1, i.e.,
ai(k) =


0, if τi(k) < ξi,
0, with probability 1− bi, if τi(k) = ξi,
1, with probability bi, if τi(k) = ξi,
1, if τi(k) > ξi.
The communicate rate of the randomized threshold optimal
policy is exactly ri. Therefore, given the allocated communi-
cation rate ri, we can calculate the corresponding threshold ξi
and randomization parameter bi as
ξi = ⌊ 1
ri
− 1⌋, bi = ξi + 1 + ri − 1
ri
,
where ⌊·⌋ denotes round downwards.
Given the parameters of the optimal randomized policy,
we can compute the corresponding optimal estimation error
Ji(ri). For the optimal single sensor scheduling under con-
strained communication, the relation of the communication
rate and the average estimation error is shown in Fig. 1. It can
be proven that the optimal estimation error Ji(ri) is piecewise
linear, convex, continuous and strictly decreasing with respect
to ri [6].
C. Max-Min Fair Allocation Approach
An optimal allocation for (6) can be found by solving the
following zero-sum game maxw∈W minr∈R
∑n
i=1 wiJi(ri).
Note that Assumption 2-4 are satisfied from the results in
the single sensor scheduling problem. Moreover, the total
bandwidth R should be strictly greater than 0. Then an
allocation scheme ri =
R
n
suffices to verify Assumption 5.
By applying the existence, we see that there exists at least
one fair allocation policy r⋆.
In addition, this formulation reveals the following result
which bridges the max-min fairness and the identical estima-
tion error, which is an extension of Corollary 1.
Proposition 1 The remote estimation errors of the sensors are
equal for unstable processes.
Algorithm 1 Solving the average constraint problem
1: Initialize r(1), 0 < η < 1, εr > 0, ε > 0, t = 1
2: Set
ri ←
{
0, if process i is stable,
η, if process i is unstable.
3: repeat
4: R← {r : 1⊤r ≤ R, r ≤ r ≤ 1}
5: repeat
6:
ri(t+ 1)← ri(t) + εJi(ri(t))
r(t+ 1)← argmin
r∈R
‖r(t+ 1)− r‖22
t← t+ 1
ε← 11
ε
+ 1
7: until ‖r(t)− r(t− 1)‖ ≤ εr
8: r˜ ← r(t)
9: if for all unstable processes
10: r˜i > ri
11: break
12: else for all unstable processes
13: ri ← η · ri
14: end if
15: until r˜i > ri for all unstable processes
Proof: Note that we must have w⋆i > 0 for unstable
processes. Otherwise, if w⋆i = 0, we have Ji(ri) being
unbounded, which certainly does not meet the max-min fair
requirement. According to Corollary 1, the result follows.
Remark 5 According to the above proposition, the min-max
criterion leads to fairness in the sense of equal remote estima-
tion performance if the processes are unstable. Nevertheless,
if there exist stable processes, it could be infeasible to find
a scheduling policy such that the remote estimation perfor-
mances of each process are equal. This occurs if the estimation
error of the state prediction for the i-th processes is less than
the steady state estimation error of the Kalman filter for the
j-th process, i.e., Tr(Pi) < Tr(Pj), where Pi = f
(i)
p (Pi)
and Pj = f
(j)
c (f
(j)
p (Pj)) with f
j
p (X) = AjXA
⊤
j + Qj and
f jc (X) = X −XC⊤j (CjXC⊤j +Rj)−1CjX . In this case, we
never have Ji(ri) = Jj(rj) for any allocation scheme because
Tr(Pi) is the largest estimation error of sensor i while Tr(Pj)
is the lowest estimation error of sensor j .
To compute the max-min fair allocation scheme using the
algorithm in (3), the validity of Assumption 6 should also be
verified. Note that the optimal average estimation performance
can be unbounded on ri ∈ (0, 1], which makes the Lipschitz
condition in Assumption 6 invalid. We overcome this issue
by imposing a very small lower bound of the minimum
communication rate ri ∈ [ri, 1] for those unstable processes.
On the compact interval [ri, 1] with ri > 0, the cost objective
Ji(ri) satisfies Assumption 6. For any lower bound ri, if
r⋆i = ri, we set ri to be a smaller value, e.g., ηri with
70 < η < 1, and then run the algorithm (3) again. This
iterative scheme stops when r⋆i > ri. In practice, however,
if the initial r is small enough, only one iteration for r is
needed. This revised fair allocation scheme seeking algorithm
is summarized in Algorithm 1. Essentially, the inner loop
corresponds to the original algorithm in (3), and the outer
loop seeks the appropriate ri.
Note that we use diminishing step sizes in the algorithm.
This is proposed to ensure that the step size meets the
convergence condition that ε ∈ (0, 2α
β2
) in finite steps as
mentioned in Theorem 3. This condition requires knowledge
of α and β before implementing the algorithm. By using
the diminishing step sizes, such a requirement is removed.
Moreover, the diminishing step sizes are always greater than
zero, which means that they also meet the positivity condition
of the step sizes in Theorem 3. The convergence of the revised
algorithm is guaranteed in the following theorem.
Theorem 4 Algorithm 1 converges to r˜⋆, which lies in an
c
1−cεr-neighborhood of a max-min fair allocation policy
of (6), i.e., ‖r⋆ − r˜⋆‖ < c1−cεr with r⋆ being a solution of
the max-min fair allocation for (6) and c being the contraction
constant for the mapping T (·). Moreover, c = 1+(ε2β2−2εα),
where ε is the stepsize when the algorithm terminates, and α
and β are the same as those in Theorem 3. In addition, for
each r, the convergence rate is linear in time.
Proof: For each R, the iteration (3) satisfies the As-
sumptions required for convergence. The positive decreasing
step sizes ε’s satisfy the requirement for the iteration to be a
contraction mapping in a finite time. By using the contraction
property developed in Theorem 3, the iteration (3) converges
for each R and the convergence rate is linear. If r˜i = ri 6= 0
for any unstable process, there exists a smaller ri, which
decreases r˜i and maxj Jj(r˜i) simultaneously. If r˜i > ri
for all unstable processes, then maxj Jj(r˜i) cannot decrease
by choosing smaller ri’s. As ri is lower bounded by zero,
the outer loop terminates in a finite time. Finally, let r be
such that T (r) = r˜⋆. We can observe that ‖r − r⋆‖ =
‖r−T (r)+T (r)−r⋆‖ ≤ εr+c‖r−r⋆‖, which is equivalent
to ‖r−r⋆‖ ≤ εr1−c . As ‖r˜⋆−r⋆‖ ≤ c‖r−r⋆‖, we can obtain‖r˜⋆ − r⋆‖ ≤ c1−cεr. This completes the proof.
IV. NUMERICAL EXAMPLES
In this section, we consider five LTI processes. The process
parameters in (4) and (5) are as follows:
A1 =
[
1.2 0
0 0
]
, Q1 =
[
4 0
0 1
]
;
A2 =
[
1.1 1
0 1
]
, Q2 =
[
1 0
0 4
]
;
A3 =
[
1.2 1
0 0.8
]
, Q3 =
[
1 0
0 4
]
A4 =
[
0.8 0.6
0 0.9
]
, Q4 =
[
16 0
0 1
]
;
A5 =
[
0.3 1
0 0.1
]
, Q5 =
[
0.3 0
0 1.2
]
,
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and Ci and Ri are two-dimensional identity matrix for all
i = 1, 2, 3, 4, 5.
By running Algorithm 1, we obtain the max-min fair al-
location scheme and corresponding average estimation error
for each processes. The results of the bandwidth resource
allocation for rtot = 2 are shown in the following Fig. 2. It
can be seen that the resource allocation converges. Moreover,
the average remote estimation errors of all processes, except
process 5, converge to the same value as shown in Fig. 3.
According to Proposition 1, the estimation errors of the
unstable processes converge to the same value as expected.
Interestingly, although process 4 is stable, its estimation error
also converges to the same value as those of the unstable
processes. Moreover, the communication rate of process 4
is the highest among all processes. Meanwhile, process 5
as a stable processes, does not occupy any communication
bandwidth. Intuitively, process 4 is most unpredictable among
the five processes in terms of the process noise covariance Qi
while process 5 is predictable in the sense that its spectral
radius is small and the process noise covariance is very small.
Although process 5 is allocated with zero communication
budget, its time-averaged estimation error is smaller than other
processes with nonzero communication resources.
As ri is initialized to be small (0.001 in the example), the
outer loop of the algorithm terminates after one run. Fig. 4
shows that the log of the error decays linearly in each iteration
in the inner loop as claimed in Theorem 3.
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V. CONCLUSION
In this work, we considered the max-min fairness criterion
for resource allocation. We specified the conditions which
guarantee the convexity and monotonicity structure of the cost
objective with respect to its allocated resources. We used a La-
grangian multiplier method to transform the original problem
into a zero-sum game. We developed an algorithm to compute
the policy at the equilibrium and proved its convergence. The
developed method was applied to a fair sensor scheduling
problem. We showed that our formulation includes “equal”
performance of the sensors if it is feasible to have an “equal-
performance” scheduling policy. We utilized the results from
the single sensor scheduling problem to efficiently compute
the update equations of the subproblems for the decomposed
problem.
The coupling between each individual is imposed in terms
of the average consumption. In a more strict situation, where
the total resource consumption constraint need to be satisfied
in each time step, a Markov game setup should be considered.
This is out of the framework developed in this work, which is
left as future work.
APPENDIX
A. Proof of Theorem 2
We first characterize key properties of an optimal solution of
Problem 1 and then the equilibrium of the iterative algorithm.
Lastly, we combine the two to prove their equivalence. The
proof relies on the notation of the normal cone of a set at its
boundary. We give its definition here for completeness.
Definition 1 [28] Given a set R ⊂ Rn and a point r ∈ R,
the normal cone of R at r is
NR(r) := {x : x⊤(r′ − r) ≤ 0, ∀r′ ∈ R}.
1) Characterization of an optimal solution: The objec-
tive function is a pointwise maximum function and is non-
differentiable. However, its subdifferentials exist.
Lemma 1 [29] If the functions Ji(ri) are subdifferentiable,
the subdifferential of maxi∈I Ji(ri) is the convex hull of the
union the subdifferentials of every Jj(rj) satisfying Jj(rj) =
maxi∈I Ji(ri), i.e.,
∂r max
i∈I
Ji(ri) = Co ∪ { ∂rJj(rj) : Jj(rj) = max
i∈I
Ji(ri) },
where Co is the convex hull of a set.
For subdifferentials, there exists a generalized KKT condi-
tion, which involves the normal cone at an optimal solution.
The relation between the normal cone and the subdifferential
of an optimal solution of Problem 1 is as follows.
Lemma 2 [30, Theorem 3.33] A point r⋆ ∈ R is an optimal
solution to Problem 1 if and only if
0 ∈ ∂rmax
i∈I
Ji(r
⋆
i ) +NR(r
⋆),
where NR(r) is the normal cone of R at r and the plus sign
stands for addition in terms of set, i.e., X + Y = { x + y| :
x ∈ X, y ∈ Y } for two sets X and Y .
Denote the active set of an optimal solution as
I⋆ = { i : Ji(r⋆i ) = max
j∈I
Jj(r
⋆
j ) }.
There exists one element in the subdifferentials of
maxi∈I Ji(r
⋆
i ) lying in the space spanned by {ei}i∈I⋆
Lemma 3 There exists α > 0 such that
∑
i∈I⋆ −αei ∈
∂rmaxi∈I Ji(r
⋆
i ), where ei is the unit vector with the i-th
component being one.
Proof: As ∂r maxi∈I Ji(r
⋆
i ) is the convex hull of
∪{∂rJi(r⋆i ) : i ∈ I⋆} and the subdifferentials of Ji(ri) are
all negative, the result follows directly.
2) Characterization of the equilibrium: For r ∈ R and
v ∈ NR(r), we have PR(r + v) = r. The equilibrium can
thus be characterized with its normal cone.
Lemma 4 [28, pp. 12] If r⋆ is the equilibrium of the discrete-
time projected dynamics (3), then
J(r⋆) ∈ NR(r⋆).
3) Proof of Theorem 2: The direction of r(k) in (3) forms
an acute angle with one of the subdifferentials of the pointwise
maximum function as
J(r)⊤
(
− ∂r max
i∈I
Ji(ri)
)
> 0.
It is expected that both vectors lie in the normal cone of the
equilibrium. The acute angle relation can be further exploited
at an optimal solution as follows.
Lemma 5 If i ∈ I⋆ and there exists i′ such that Ji′(r⋆i′ ) <
Ji(r
⋆
i ), then r
⋆
i = min{R, 1}, which is the maximum allowable
resource.
Proof: We prove by contradiction. Suppose i ∈ I⋆ and
r⋆i < min{R, 1}. Let ri = min{R, 1}. In addition, fix one
i′ ∈ I\I⋆, and let ri′ = r⋆i′ − (min{R, 1} − r⋆i ). For other
j ∈ I\{i, i′}, let rj = r⋆j . We can obtain
J(r⋆)⊤(r − r⋆)
=Ji(r
⋆
i )(min{R, 1} − r⋆i ) + Ji′(r⋆i′ )(r⋆i −min{R, 1})
=(Ji(r
⋆
i )− Ji′(r⋆i′ ))(min{R, 1} − r⋆i ) > 0.
This contradicts that J(r⋆) ∈ NR(r⋆).
9Now we are ready to prove Theorem 2. We separate the
discussion for two cases. Firstly, if Ji(r
⋆
i ) = maxj∈I Jj(r
⋆
j )
for every i ∈ I, then∑
i∈I⋆
Ji(r
⋆
i )(ri − r⋆i ) =
∑
i∈I
Ji(r
⋆
i )(ri − r⋆i ) ≤ 0. (7)
Secondly, if there exists i′ such that Ji′(r
⋆
i′ ) < Ji(r
⋆
i ), then
according to Lemma 5, we have∑
i∈I⋆
Ji(r
⋆
i )(ri − r⋆i ) =
∑
i∈I⋆
Ji(r
⋆
i )(ri −min{R, 1}) ≤ 0.
By the definition of NR(r
⋆), we have
∑
i∈I⋆ ei ∈ NR(r⋆),
where ei is the unit vector with the i-th component being one.
Since there exists a constant α > 0 such that∑
i∈I⋆
−αei ∈∂rmax
i∈I
Ji(ri)
=Co ∪ { ∂rJj(rj) : Jj(rj) = max
i∈I
Ji(ri) }.
Therefore,
0 ∈ ∂r max
i∈I
Ji(ri) +NR(r
⋆),
which completes the proof.
B. Distributed Algorithm
The algorithm in (3) is centralized because of the projection
operation. We can develop a distributed version of it by
distributing the projection operation. To accomplish such a
goal, we take a step backward. Algorithm (3) can be perceived
as a projected gradient descent algorithm for the following
optimization problem
min
r
∑
i∈I
J˜i(ri)
s.t.
∑
i∈I
ri ≤ R, ri ∈ [ri, ri], (8)
where
J˜i(ri) :=
∫ ri
0
−Ji(t)dt.
This formulation can be included in a distributed optimization
framework as both the objective function and the constraint
is written in a separable summation form. We propose one
intuitive implementation1. The dual problem of (8) can be
written as
max
λ≥0
q(λ),
where q(λ) = minr≤r≤r
∑
i∈I
(
J˜i(ri) + λ(ri − R/n)
)
. By
making n copies of the dual variable λ, this dual problem can
be reformulated as
max
λ≥0
∑
i∈I
qi(λi)
s.t. λi = λj ∀i, j ∈ I,
1Other implementations such as [31], [32] are also available.
where qi(λi) = minri≤ri≤ri J˜i(ri)+λi(ri−R/n). The above
constraint can also be relaxed over an undirected graph. Each
sensor i can acquire λj from a subset of I and the constraint
can be compactly written as
Lλ = 0,
where L is a n × n matrix with its element in the i-th row
j-column being
L[i,j] =


0, if i and j are not connected,
− 1
Ni
, if j is connceted to i,
1, if i = j,
where Ni is the number of nodes connecting to node i.
Consider the following augmented Lagrangian
L(r,λ) =
∑
i∈I
(
J˜i(ri) + λi(ri −R/n)
)
− λ⊤Lλ,
which is convex in r as Ji(ri) are decreasing and continuous,
and concave in λ. The perturbed primal-dual subgradient
update can be written as
r(k + 1) = P[r,r]
(
r(k)− ǫ(k)∇rL(r(k), λˆ(k + 1))
)
λ(k + 1) = P[0,+∞]
(
λ(k) + ǫ(k)∇λL(rˆ(k + 1),λ(k))
)
,
where [r, r] denotes the box constraint for r and [0,+∞]
denotes the positivity constraint for λ. Note that in the update
terms, λ(k) and r(k) has been replaced by two perturbation
terms λˆ(k + 1) and rˆ(k + 1). This is adopted to ensure
convergence for general convex-concave Lagrangian functions.
These perturbation terms λˆ(k) and rˆ(k)) can be calculated by
rˆ(k + 1) = P[r,r]
(
r(k)− ǫˆ(k)∇rL(r(k),λ(k))
)
λˆ(k + 1) = P[0,+∞]
(
λ(k) + ǫˆ(k)∇λL(r(k),λ(k))
)
.
The selection of the step sizes ǫ(k) and ǫˆ(k) and the con-
vergence of this perturbed primal-dual subgradient algorithm
have been shown in [33]. Since the updating terms
∇rL(r(k),λ(k)) =J(r(k)) + λ(k)
∇λL(r(k),λ(k)) =r(k)−R/n− Lλ(k)
does not require knowledge of Ji(ri) and ri(k) of other nodes
and the projections can be done for each component, this
algorithm is distributed.
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